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Abstract
We demonstrate how a particular type of knowledge about objects, their
spatial locations and thus how to direct actions toward them, contributes
to the comprehension of language about those objects. In four experiments,
participants judged if sentences were about normal objects (e.g., ‘‘The
apple has a stem’’) or odd objects (e.g., ‘‘The apple has an antenna’’).
The Normal response key was either on the left of a response box or on
the right. The named objects were themselves either on the left or the right
of the response box. We demonstrate a compatibility e¤ect in which re-
sponding Normal to the side where the object was located was faster than
responding Normal to the opposite side. Furthermore, this e¤ect was
equally strong for sentences describing states of the objects (as above) and
sentences describing actions (e.g., ‘‘Touch the apple at the stem’’); the
compatibility e¤ect was found when the objects were removed; the e¤ect
required compatibility between actions, not just spatial locations; and the
e¤ect was found in both English and German. The results are discussed in
relation to how action systems are used in language comprehension.
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1. Introduction
What sort of object knowledge contributes to the comprehension of lan-
guage about those objects? Here we investigate one type of knowledge
that we characterize as episodic a¤ordances: temporary characteristics of
objects, such as spatial location, that determine how to interact with those
objects. For example, where an object is located helps to determine how
to look at it, how to grasp it, and how to move toward or away from it.
We call these sorts of a¤ordances ‘‘episodic’’ because they can change
from moment to moment (as the location of the object or the actor
changes), as opposed to more permanent a¤ordances such as the fact
that a cup a¤ords drinking. We begin by reviewing the notion of a¤ord-
ances in language comprehension. Next, we present four experiments that
demonstrate the use of episodic a¤ordances during language comprehen-
sion. These experiments reveal that episodic a¤ordances play a role in
language comprehension a) when sentences describe actions and when
they describe states, irrespective of the speciﬁc language used, b) when
the objects are visible in the environment and when they are not, c)
when real actions correspond closely to described actions, and d) that
the e¤ect is more strongly associated with information about action than
information about spatial location.
1.1. A¤ordances in language comprehension
The notion of a¤ordances was developed by Gibson (e.g., 1979) to char-
acterize the interaction between types of bodies and types of objects. That
is, an object such as a chair a¤ords some interactions (e.g., sitting, but not
swimming) for some types of bodies (e.g., humans, but not dolphins).
Particulars of the body may be important, in that, for example, a chair
may a¤ord hiding for a child but not an adult. There are four sources of
support for the claim that a¤ordances play a role in language comprehen-
sion: logical and theoretical, data from neuroscientiﬁc investigations of
language, studies of eye movements, and other behavioral data.
Consider the logical and theoretical grounds ﬁrst. Searle (1980) devel-
oped the case that the abstract, amodal, and arbitrary symbols of lan-
guage (i.e., words) can only be meaningful when those symbols are
grounded in something outside of the symbol system. Without that
grounding, words, like mathematical symbols (e.g., X ¼ 2Y), can equally
well refer to an inﬁnity of objects and relations with no way to constrain
them to the particular situation a speaker or writer wishes to communi-
cate about (see also Putnam, as cited in Lako¤ 1987).
Glenberg and Robertson (1999, 2000) demonstrated the necessity of
grounding in language comprehension tasks and developed the Indexical
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Hypothesis (IH) as a means of describing how the symbols of language
become grounded. According to the IH, words and phrases are indexed,
or mapped, onto objects in the environment or perceptual symbols (Bar-
salou 1999), which are analog representations extracted from perceptual
experience. Next, a¤ordances are derived from the objects or perceptual
symbols (Borghi et al. 2004; Glenberg and Robertson 2000; Kaschak
and Glenberg 2000). Finally, the a¤ordances are combined or meshed (in-
tegrated in a manner that respects bodily and physical constraints on
action) as directed by syntactic constructions (Coventry and Garrod
2003; De Vega et al. 2004; Kaschak and Glenberg 2000). On this account,
language understanding requires the integration of a¤ordances, not sim-
ply the alignment of words. The product of the mesh process is grounded
in perception and action, and it has the further beneﬁt of directly guiding
action in the world.
The proposition that a¤ordances are considered during language com-
prehension is consistent with several lines of evidence from neuroscience.
For example, Hauk and colleagues (2004) used fMRI to examine di¤er-
ential activation of brain regions while people listened to verbs such as
‘‘lick,’’ ‘‘pick,’’ and ‘‘kick.’’ The verbs selectively activated areas of the
motor cortex corresponding to the actions the verbs described. Buccino
and colleagues (2005) measured electrical activity in hand and leg muscles
as people listened to sentences describing activities normally utilizing
hands or legs. When transcranial magnetic stimulation of corresponding
areas of the motor cortex was used, the measured electrical activity (in
the e¤ector muscles) was sensitive to the sentence content (see also, Glen-
berg et al. 2008). Finally, Rizzolatti and Arbib (1998) have speculated
about the evolutionary development of language from the mirror neuron
system (which includes an area of monkey brain, F5, homologous to
Broca’s area in humans). Mirror neurons appear to be used in recogniz-
ing the actions of conspeciﬁcs as the same as actions undertaken by the
self (Buccino et al. 2004). Thus, the mirror neuron system has been linked
to language, gesture, and actions, providing at least one source for a link
between language and a¤ordances.
Work examining eye movements during language comprehension is
also consistent with a link between language comprehension and a¤ord-
ances. Chambers and colleagues (2002) recorded eye movements while
people listened to (and then acted on) commands to move various objects
displayed in front of the listener, equivalent to: Put the X into the Y.
Upon hearing ‘‘into’’, the eyes would preferentially move to a container
that a¤orded the action even before the container was mentioned. Kamide
and colleagues (2003) recorded eye movements to objects in a picture while
people listened to sentences such as ‘‘The woman will slide the butter to
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the man’’ or ‘‘The woman will spread the butter on the bread.’’ For the
‘‘spread’’ sentence, there were more anticipatory eye movements to a pic-
ture of bread (an object that easily a¤ords spreading) than for the ‘‘slide’’
sentence.
A particularly compelling demonstration of the embodiment of lan-
guage comprehension was reported by Chambers and colleagues (2004).
Participants listened to sentences describing an action, and then they
took the relevant action. While listening and acting, the participant’s eye
movements were monitored. Consider the following situation. The partic-
ipant was facing four items, a whistle on a plate, an empty box, an empty
folder, and a whistle (with a lanyard) on a folder. The participant listened
and acted on two types of sentences. (1) ‘‘Put the whistle that’s on the
folder in the box,’’ and (2) ‘‘Put the whistle on the folder in the box’’. Sen-
tence (2) uses a reduced relative clause (the ‘‘that’s on’’ is eliminated).
Sentence (2) is perfectly acceptable in some situations, namely when there
are two whistles in the environment that need to be di¤erentiated. In this
case, a relative clause (‘‘that’s on the folder’’ or the reduced ‘‘on the
folder’’) is expected because it di¤erentiates between the two whistles. If
there had been only one whistle, however, then Sentence (2) is temporar-
ily ambiguous. That is, while listening to the beginning of the sentence,
‘‘Put the whistle on the folder . . .’’ one could reasonably interpret ‘‘on
the folder’’ as the place to put the one whistle. In fact, when there were
two whistles, participants spent little time looking at the empty folder,
presumably because the relative clause (full or reduced) was expected.
In another condition of the experiment, the participants were given a
hook to hold, and they were required to use the hook to carry out the in-
structions. In this condition, there was functionally only one whistle be-
cause only the whistle with the lanyard a¤ords picking up and moving
with the hook. In this condition when people heard Sentence (2), they
spent substantially more time looking at the empty folder than when
they heard Sentence (1). The interpretation of this e¤ect is quite striking:
Holding the hook changes the a¤ordances of the situation so that func-
tionally there is only one whistle. This change in a¤ordances changes the
preferred parsing of the reduced relative clause so that ‘‘. . . on the folder’’
is interpreted as a goal location (hence the time spent looking at the
empty folder) rather than a relative clause di¤erentiating the two whistles.
Furthermore, Chambers and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that the ef-
fects of changing the a¤ordances were observable as soon as 150 msec.
after the word ‘‘whistle’’ was uttered. In other words, the a¤ordances af-
fected the immediate, on-line parsing of the sentence.
A many behavioral studies are consistent with the hypothesis that lan-
guage comprehension taps information about a¤ordances. Borghi and
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colleagues (2004) had participants verify that an object named in a sen-
tence (e.g., ‘‘There is a car in front of you’’) has various parts (e.g., roof
or wheel). Half of the parts were near the top of the object (e.g., roof )
and would require movements in an upward direction to interact with
those parts, whereas the other half of the parts were located near the bot-
tom of the object (e.g., wheel). In one condition, to respond ‘‘Yes, the ob-
ject has the part’’ the participant was required to move to a response but-
ton that required an upward movement, and in another condition the Yes
response required a downward movement. People were faster to respond
Yes when the direction of movement was consistent with the direction
needed to interact with the named part of the object. Furthermore, this
Action-sentence Compatibility E¤ect (ACE) was greater when movement
to the button was required rather than simply pressing buttons in a com-
patible spatial location, thus implicating action-based information and
not simply a spatial code. Apparently, simply considering an object,
even without any intent to act, leads to the derivation of a¤ordances (see
also, Tucker and Ellis 1998). Using a similar methodology, Glenberg and
Kaschak (2002) asked participants to discriminate between sensible sen-
tences (e.g., ‘‘Open the drawer’’) and nonsense sentences (e.g., ‘‘Open the
plate’’) using movements to a button close to the body or away from the
body. They also observed an ACE in that responding was faster when the
response required movement (e.g., toward the body) in a direction com-
patible with the direction implied by the sentence (e.g., opening a drawer
generally requires movement toward the body). These data support the
hypothesis that understanding a sentence requires consideration or simu-
lation of the actions underlying the sentence. Glenberg and Kaschak also
reported some evidence that people engage in bodily simulation even
when understanding abstract ideas that do not directly correspond to
actions.
The four experiments reported next use the ACE methodology to ex-
tend this work in several directions. First, we ask if language comprehen-
sion is sensitive to episodic a¤ordances, for example, a¤ordances that
change with the location of the object relative to the actor. Some of the
work cited above is consistent with this proposal, but none of it tested
the proposal directly. Second, we determine if this episodic ACE requires
sentences that describe or suggest action (as in Glenberg and Kaschak
2002), or whether it can be found with descriptive sentences as in Borghi
and colleagues (2004). Third, we ask if the ACE depends on the objects
being literally available for interaction, or whether the e¤ect can also be
found when the objects are no longer literally available, thereby implicat-
ing the use of perceptual symbols in the derivation of episodic a¤ord-
ances. Fourth, as in Borghi and colleagues we will determine if the ACE
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reﬂects action-based information (such as a¤ordances) or spatial location.
Fifth, we will show that the ACE is language-independent by replicating
the main results of Experiment 1 with sentences written in German.
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Participants
A total of 51 participants were recruited from introductory psychology
classes at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and they were given par-
tial course credit for their participation. Participants were treated in
accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American Psychological
Association.
2.2. Design and materials
All participants read a sentence centered on a computer screen, and they
determined if the sentence was about a normal object or an odd one.
There were several between subjects variables that were counterbalanced.
For Response Direction, half the participants responded ‘‘Normal’’ by
moving the right hand o¤ a centered start key and then to the left, and
they responded ‘‘Odd’’ by moving to a key on the right. The other half
of the participants had the reverse assignment. There were two sets of six
objects each, and each object had a particular part referred to in some of
the sentences. Set A objects (and parts) were: apple (stem), pen (clip),
shoe (heel), cup (handle), glasses (earpiece), bottle (neck). Set B objects
were ﬂower (leaf ), watch (wristband), cell phone (antenna), knife (blade),
nail (tip), and teddy bear (ear). For the independent variable Visible Set,
half the participants had Set A objects arrayed in front of them, and half
had Set B objects in front of them. The remaining objects were not visi-
ble. For the Left Objects variable, for half of the participants, the ﬁrst
three objects were arrayed on the left (e.g, apple, pen, and shoe in Set A)
and the remaining three objects were on the right, and for half of the par-
ticipants the arrangement was reversed. There were also several within-
subjects variables. For Sentence-Action, half of the sentences described a
hand/arm action (hold, touch, press, grab, pick-up, and pull) that could
be made in regard to an object using the object’s named part (e.g, ‘‘Hold
the apple by the stem’’), and half of the sentences described an attribute
of the object (e.g., ‘‘The apple is red’’). For Sentence-Normalcy, two-
thirds of the sentences described a normal version of an object, and one-
third of the sentences described an unusual or odd version of the object
(e.g., ‘‘Hold the wristband of the apple’’ and ‘‘The apple has an an-
tenna’’). The odd objects were described using components from the nor-
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mal objects. Each object name appeared in 18 sentences, once with each
of the six action verbs, once in six di¤erent descriptive sentences, in three
sentences using an action verb and an odd object, and in three sentences
describing an odd object. Because there were 12 objects there was a total
of 216 sentences.
2.3. Procedure
Participants signed consent forms and then were directed to examine,
pick up, and replace (on Velcro tabs) each of the six visible objects. Par-
ticipants were then instructed on how to press the Start key with the index
ﬁnger of the right hand to initiate presentation of a sentence, and how to
move the same hand to either the Normal or Odd keys. Furthermore,
they were instructed to read the sentence completely while holding the
Start key because the sentence would disappear as soon as the key was
released. Participants received 20 practice trials during which pressing
the Start key presented the word ‘‘Normal’’ or ‘‘Odd’’ and the participant
was to move to the appropriate response key. Next, participants practiced
reading, judging, and responding to 10 sentences naming objects that
were otherwise not mentioned in any sentence. Finally, the 216 experi-
mental sentences were displayed in a quasi-random order that di¤ered
for each participant. For each sentence, we recorded both the time be-
tween pressing the start key and releasing the start key (the reading time,
RT) and the response key pressed (Normal or Odd). We also recorded
the movement time (time between releasing the start key and depressing
a response key). Movement time was used only in the trimming procedure
described next.
2.4. Results and discussion
The data from two subjects with very high error rates (e.g., about 90%
errors; probably because of a miscoding in the data ﬁle) were eliminated.
We then examined the di¤erence in error rates between the Normal and
Odd sentences because a large di¤erence indicates that the participant
was likely biased toward either the Normal or Odd response. We looked
for a discontinuity in the distribution of di¤erences and eliminated partic-
ipants with di¤erences above the discontinuity. In Experiment 1 we elim-
inated 10 participants with a di¤erence in error rates of 0.10 or greater,
leaving a total of 39 participants. (The discontinuity criterion varied
across experiments from 0.06 to 0.15.)
We performed analyses for the Normal sentences referring to the visi-
ble objects, that is, the sentences for which we predicted an ACE. In these
analyses, we disregarded whether Object Set A or B was the visible set,
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and we collapsed the independent variables Response Direction and Left
Object into one variable called Compatibility. For this variable, the direc-
tion of responding and the object location were either Compatible (e.g,
when the sentence is about a normal object, the object is on the left, and
the normal response key is on the left) or Incompatible (e.g., when the
sentence is about a normal object, the object is on the left, and the normal
response key is on the right). The ACE corresponds to a main e¤ect of
Compatibility. Thus, the variables in the analysis were Compatibility
and Sentence-Action (whether the sentence describes an object or de-
scribes an action on the object). The important means are in Table 1. A
type 1 error rate of 0.05 was used in all analyses. We report all signiﬁcant
results for these items. Following the advice of Raaijmakers and col-
leagues (1999) for designs such as those used in these experiments, we re-
port only F-statistics based on subject variability.
The most important ﬁnding is the signiﬁcant ACE (Compatibility
e¤ect) of 56 msec, F (1, 38) ¼ 5.83, Mse ¼ 20742. That is, people were
faster to respond correctly when the correct response (Normal, for these
sentences) requires movement toward the same side as the location of
the object. The size of the ACE was similar for the Action sentences
(63 msec) and the Descriptive sentences (49 msec), and the interaction of
Compatibility and Sentence-Action was not signiﬁcant, F < 1. There was
also a main e¤ect of Sentence-Action, F (1, 38) ¼ 38.91, Mse ¼ 24191, at
least in part because the Action sentences were on average several words
longer than the Non-Action sentences.
There was also a signiﬁcant e¤ect in the analysis of error rates (see
Table 1 for means), namely, the main e¤ect of Compatibility, F (1, 38) ¼
7.26, Mse ¼ 0.004. Because there were more errors for the Incompatible
condition than the Compatible condition, and the reading times were
slower in the Incompatible condition, it is unlikely that the ACE reﬂects
some sort of speed-accuracy tradeo¤.
These results are exactly what were expected according to the IH and
the proposition that language comprehension requires the derivation of
Table 1. Results from Experiment 1
Compatibility Sentence-Action
Action Descriptive
Error rate RT Error rate RT
Incompatible .07 1533 .06 1371
Compatible .03 1470 .04 1322
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episodic a¤ordances. That is, in understanding a sentence such as ‘‘Touch
the apple by the stem,’’ people index terms such as ‘‘the apple’’ to the
actual apple in the environment. Then, the a¤ordances of this particular
apple, that is, how to interact with it, become relevant. In this case, loca-
tion of the apple determines whether interaction requires movement to
the left or right. When that direction matches the direction required to
make the Normal response, responding is facilitated relative to when the
directions mismatch. Importantly, the ACE is found for both Action sen-
tences and Descriptive sentences such as, ‘‘The apple is red.’’ The correct
response for descriptive sentences could always be determined by consult-
ing a putative semantic memory representation. Apparently, however, the
participants indexed the words to the objects and derived a¤ordances,
leading to the ACE.
3. Experiment 2
The IH and the notion of episodic a¤ordances provide one explanation
for the results of Experiment 1. There is at least one important alterna-
tive, however. Suppose that the participants oriented towards objects
named in the sentence, and the orientation a¤ected action independent
of any language comprehension processes. For example, Grubb and
Reed (2002) report that rotating the trunk of the body can facilitate
responding to objects in the same direction and interfere with respond-
ing in the opposite direction. Consequently, the results of Experiment 1
do not require an explanation in terms of a¤ordances being used in lan-
guage comprehension. Instead, the compatibility e¤ect may simply re-
ﬂect the compatibility between a physical or attentional orientation and
responding.
Experiment 2 was designed to provide a test of this alternative hypoth-
esis. For each participant, the ﬁrst quarter of the experiment (54 trials)
followed the same procedure as Experiment 1 with the exception that the
sentences were only about the visible objects (in Set A or Set B). For the
second quarter of the experiment, the objects were removed, and thus
there were no physical objects to orient toward. We reasoned that if par-
ticipants were indexing the words to perceptual symbols derived from
recent experience, then the perceptual symbols should include location
information that would produce an ACE. For the third quarter of the ex-
periment, the objects in the alternative set (Set B or Set A) were physically
present and the sentences were only about those objects. Finally, in the
fourth quarter of the experiment, those objects were removed. In short,
will we observe an ACE when objects are physically present (replicating
Experiment 1)? And, will we observe and ACE when the objects are not
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present, contrary to an orientation explanation, but consistent with a per-
ceptual symbol interpretation?
The data can also be used to test another type of attention hypothesis,
namely, a shift in attention to guide hand movements. First, consider that
Richardson and Spivey (2000) have demonstrated that in a recall task
people tend to look at locations that had held objects even when those
objects are no longer present. Thus, participants in Experiment 2 might
also orient attention to the locations of the removed objects. Second, Riz-
zolatti and colleagues (1987; see also, Rizzolatti et al. 1997) have demon-
strated that reorienting attention across the visual vertical meridian incurs
a cost. Thus, suppose that attention is directed toward the location of the
removed items in order to guide hand movements to make the response.
When the reorientation crosses the vertical meridian, as would be more
likely in making an incompatible response than a compatible response,
there is a cost associated with the reorientation that shows up as an
ACE. Note that this hypothesis predicts an ACE in the movement times
when visual guidance is necessary. If the ACE is found in the reading
times of the sentences referring to the removed objects, then it is unlikely
to be due to a shift in attention for hand movement guidance. That is,
even if participants orient to the locations of the missing items (as in Ri-
chardson and Spivey 2000), there is no need to reorient, and indeed the
participant cannot know what location to reorient toward until after the
sentence is read and comprehended and reading time determined.
3.1. Participants
The 48 participants were selected as in Experiment 1.
3.2. Materials
The sentences and objects were the same as in Experiment 1.
3.3. Design and procedure
The design was similar to that of Experiment 1 except for three di¤er-
ences. First, there was no variable of Visible Set; that is, the sentences
always referred to items that were (or had been) visible. Second, partici-
pants began with either Set A or Set B objects and the Set order was
counterbalanced. Third, we introduced another independent variable,
Objects-Present: For the ﬁrst quarter of the trials, the referent objects
(Set A or Set B) were Present, for the second quarter the objects were Re-
moved; for the third quarter the alternative objects were Present, and for
the last quarter these objects were Removed.
122 A. M. Glenberg et al.
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Before the ﬁrst quarter, participants picked up and replaced (on a Vel-
cro tab) each of the six objects, practiced moving from the Start key to
the Normal and Odd response keys, and practiced responding to Normal
and Odd sentences. At the end of the ﬁrst quarter of trials, the computer
signaled the participant to call the Experimenter who removed the ob-
jects. The participants were not informed that the objects would be re-
moved before this time. After the second quarter, the computer again sig-
naled the participant to call the experimenter who positioned the second
set of objects. The participant manipulated these objects before beginning
the third quarter of the trials. After the third quarter, the second set of
objects was removed.
3.4. Results and discussion
The same data trimming procedures were used as in Experiment 1, except
the criterion for excluding participants for a di¤erence in Normal and
Odd error rates was set at 0.15 or greater where there seemed to be a clus-
ter of participants di¤erent from the rest. In all, the data from ﬁve partic-
ipants were eliminated, resulting in a ﬁnal set of 43 participants (from the
initial set of 48). The data of major interest are presented in Table 2.
The 54 msec ACE (main e¤ect of Compatibility) was signiﬁcant,
F (1, 42) ¼ 18.33, Mse ¼ 13620. The interaction between Compatibility
and Objects-Present was not signiﬁcant, F (1, 42) < 1, indicating that the
size of the ACE was comparable when the objects were Present (71 msec)
and when the objects were Removed (38 msec). However, the 71 msec
ACE is signiﬁcant, F (1, 42) ¼ 14.67, Mse ¼ 14405, and the 38 msec ACE
is not, F (1, 42) ¼ 1.99, Mse ¼ 30699. At ﬁrst glance, this may appear to
be problematic. However, Experiment 3 provides a replication of the
ACE e¤ect in the Removed condition that is quite large (91 msecs),
F (1, 57) ¼ 16.03, Mse ¼ 28644. Thus, the evidence for an ACE with
Table 2. Results from Experiment 2
Objects-Present Compatibility Sentence-Action
Action Descriptive
Error rate RT Error rate RT
Present Incompatible .11 1590 .09 1453
Compatible .10 1536 .06 1367
Removed Incompatible .10 1442 .08 1358
Compatible .08 1426 .09 1299
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objects removed (lack of an interaction of Compatibility and Objects-
Present in Experiment 2, a signiﬁcant e¤ect of Compatibility in the Re-
moved condition of Experiment 3) is, in total, reasonably strong.1
There was a signiﬁcant e¤ect of Sentence-Action, F (1, 42) ¼ 22.45,
Mse ¼ 64084 because the Action sentences tended to be several words
longer than the Descriptive sentences. There were no signiﬁcant e¤ects in
an analysis of error rates.
The ACE for the objects Present condition provided a replication of
Experiment 1. Again, we conclude that episodic a¤ordances are consid-
ered during language comprehension both for sentences that describe
action and for sentences that do not. Importantly, the data from the ob-
jects Removed condition allow us to rule out the alternative that the ACE
is due to (physical or attentional) orientation to a particular object or side
rather than language comprehension. That is, when the objects are re-
moved, participants have no reason to physically orient to a particular
side. Instead, people understand the sentences by indexing the words
(e.g., ‘‘the apple’’) to a perceptual symbol (rather than the object itself ).
A¤ordances are derived from this perceptual symbol, and because loca-
tion of an object relative to an actor helps to determine the interactions
with those objects, location a¤ects the derivation of a¤ordances. These
a¤ordances are revealed by the ACE. As noted in the introduction to
this experiment, because we used reading time as a dependent variable,
and not movement time, the data are also contrary to the hypothesis
that the ACE reﬂects only a reorientation of attention to guide hand
movements.
4. Experiment 3
The data from the ﬁrst two experiments demonstrate e¤ects of episodic
information on language comprehension. But, can these e¤ects be in-
terpreted as due to a¤ordances, that is, possibilities for interacting with
objects, or might another type of information, such as spatial location,
1. Why might the e¤ect be signiﬁcant in Experiment 3 and not in Experiment 2? It might
indicate that the e¤ect is unreliable. However, given that the e¤ect was so large in
Experiment 3 and approached signiﬁcance in Experiment 2, it seems more likely that
the di¤erence reﬂects sampling error contributing to a Type II statistical error in Exper-
iment 2. Supporting this speculation, Cumming (2008) documents how p-values are
remarkably inconsistent across exact replications. For example, Cumming reports on
25 simulations of an independent sample, two-group experiment, each with an e¤ect
size of .5, and each with a sample size of 32 for each group. Over the 25 simulations,
p ranged from less than .001 to .759! Furthermore, 13 of the 25 simulations had p > .05.
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underlie the e¤ect? Experiment 3 was undertaken to answer this question.
We reasoned that if the ACE was due to a¤ordances derived from the ob-
jects, then the e¤ect will be large when the action required to make the
response (moving to the Normal key) is compatible or not with the a¤ord-
ances derived from the object at a particular location. In contrast, sup-
pose that the ACE were due to match or mismatch of spatial location of
the object and spatial location of the response key. In this case, an ACE
would be found whether or not there is action directed at a location; the
mere fact that the response key was in a compatible or incompatible spa-
tial location should produce an ACE.
In Experiment 3, participants used two response modes. The Move-
ment mode was similar to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. The Loca-
tion mode used the same spatial arrangement of Normal and Odd keys
as in the Movement mode, however, the participant did not move his or
her hand to the keys. Instead, one index ﬁnger rested on each of the keys
(the assignment of left or right to Normal or Odd was counterbalanced
between participants as in Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 3, all re-
sponding was done using a symmetric keyboard. The Normal and Odd
keys were the far left and far right keys on the top row of the keyboard
(tilde and del). We made this change so that other laboratories would be
able to replicate our experiments without needing to construct a special-
ized response apparatus.
The design of the experiment also allows us to test another attention
hypothesis. Suppose, as noted before, participants attend to objects men-
tioned in the sentence or to the locations of the removed objects as in
Richardson and Spivey (2000). This allocation of attention might create
a type of Simon e¤ect (e.g., Simon 1990) in that people are attending to
one spatial location (that of the object) but must make a response in a dif-
ferent spatial location. Perhaps it is this Simon e¤ect that produces the
ACE. In this case, the ACE should be found in both the Movement
mode and the Location mode. If the ACE is found only in the Movement
mode, we can rule out this version of the attention hypothesis.
4.1. Participants
The 65 participants were selected as in Experiment 1.
4.2. Design and procedure
Much like Experiment 2, the experiment was divided into quarters. In
the ﬁrst quarter, participants were randomly assigned to object Set A or
Set B. Also randomly assigned was initial Response Mode (Movement or
Location). The second quarter maintained the Object Set and Response
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Mode assignments, but the objects were removed (as in Experiment 2).
For the third and fourth quarters, both the Object Set assignment and
the Response Mode assignment were changed to the other alternatives.
The objects were Present in the third quarter and removed for the fourth
quarter.
In the Movement response mode, participants used the right index or
middle ﬁnger to ﬁrst press the space bar and initiate presentation of the
sentence. Next, they moved the right hand so that the index or middle
ﬁnger would press either the Normal or Odd key. In the Location mode,
the participant’s hands rested on the keyboard so that the thumbs were
on the space bar and the middle ﬁngers rested on the Normal and Odd
keys. The participant pressed the space bar to initiate presentation of the
sentence and then used the middle ﬁnger to make the Normal or Odd
response. Note that unlike the Movement condition, the participant
did not have to move his or her hands to a new location to make the
judgment.
4.3. Results and discussion
The data from one participant were eliminated for an error rate in excess
of 15 percent. The data from six other participants were eliminated for
having a di¤erence between Normal and Odd sentence error rates of
more than 6 percent (where there appeared to be a cluster of participants
di¤erent from the majority). For the remaining 58 participants, all error
trials were eliminated before analyzing the reaction times. The data of
major interest are in Table 3.
Table 3. Results from Experiment 3
Response Mode Objects- Present Compatibility Sentence-Action
Action Description
Error
rate
RT Error
rate
RT
Movement Present Incompatible .08 1875 .06 1677
Compatible .06 1744 .04 1629
Removed Incompatible .03 1595 .08 1600
Compatible .02 1552 .04 1461
Location Present Incompatible .07 1631 .07 1503
Compatible .06 1664 .06 1476
Removed Incompatible .05 1392 .07 1400
Compatible .03 1382 .05 1339
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In replication of Experiments 1 and 2, a 53 msec ACE (main e¤ect of
Compatibility) was signiﬁcant, F (1, 57) ¼ 15.36, Mse ¼ 42510. Also as
in Experiment 2, there was no interaction between Compatibility and
Objects-Present, F (1, 57) ¼ 0.73, Mse ¼ 31043, indicating a substantial
ACE e¤ect for both objects Present (43 msec) and objects Removed
(63 msec).
The most important e¤ect for this experiment is the interaction be-
tween Response Mode and Compatibility. That is, does the size of the
ACE change with the response mode? The answer is ‘‘yes’’, as indicated
by the within-a-hair’s-breadth-signiﬁcant interaction, F (1, 57) ¼ 3.63,
Mse ¼ 87282, p ¼ 0.06. In the Movement Response Mode, the 90 msec
ACE was signiﬁcant, t (57) ¼ 3.49, SE ¼ 26, whereas in the Location Re-
sponse Mode, the 16 msec ACE was not signiﬁcant, t (57) ¼ .76, SE ¼ 21.
Apparently, the ACE reﬂects derivation of a¤ordances because it is
robust when there is real action, but the e¤ect is much reduced when the
incompatibility is between spatial locations. Furthermore, given that the
ACE is not signiﬁcant in the Location Response Mode, we can rule out
the version of the attention hypothesis described in the introduction to
this experiment.
There were several other signiﬁcant e¤ects, although they do not ap-
pear to compromise the main conclusions. There was a signiﬁcant e¤ect
of Sentence-Action, F (1, 57) ¼ 23.47, Mse ¼ 86818, because the Action
sentences tended to be several words longer than the Descriptive sen-
tences. There was also a main e¤ect of Objects-Present, F (1, 57) ¼ 88.45,
Mse ¼ 89270. Responding was slower when the objects were Present
compared to Removed, probably because of practice e¤ects (the objects
were always Present before they were Removed). There was also a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between Sentence-Action and Objects-Present, F (1, 57) ¼
19.05, Mse ¼ 48737. In the Objects-Present condition, the Descriptive
sentences were read 157 msec faster than the Action sentences, whereas
in the Objects-Absent condition this di¤erence was only 30 msec. This
interaction is also likely to be due to practice e¤ects. That is, after prac-
tice with the names of the objects, parts, and verbs, the di¤erence in
length between the Action and Descriptive sentences did not count for as
much.
In the analysis of error rates, there was a signiﬁcant e¤ect of Compati-
bility, F (1, 57) ¼ 11.66, Mse ¼ 0.006, and a signiﬁcant e¤ect of Objects-
Present, F (1, 57) ¼ 5.03, Mse ¼ 0.008. There was also a signiﬁcant inter-
action between Objects-Present and Sentence-Action, F (1, 57) ¼ 17.69,
Mse ¼ 0.006. Importantly, there was no hint of an interaction between
Movement Condition and Compatibility that might have compromised
the interpretation of the reaction time data, F (1, 57) ¼ 0.61,Mse ¼ 0.005.
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5. Experiment 4
Experiment 4 was a close replication of Experiment 1 that di¤ered in two
ways. First, the sentences were translated into German, and the partici-
pants were native German speakers. Second, the response apparatus was
a keyboard, much like in Experiment 3. Experiment 4 was conducted for
two reasons. First, by providing a cross-language replication, it indicates
that the derivation and use of episodic a¤ordances is not peculiar to
English or proclivities of American students. Second, when compared to
an unreported experiment, it reinforces the conclusion that the ACE
arises from action systems, not just spatial relations. The unreported ex-
periment was also a replication of Experiment 1 using German sentences.
However, the response apparatus was a joystick that could be moved
from side to side by turning the wrist. In that experiment, there was nary
a hint of an ACE.2 On reﬂection, we realized that the wrist movements
were quite di¤erent (in extent, direction—they were rotational—and ef-
fector systems) from those that would be used to literally interact with
the objects on either side of the participant. Consequently, we ran the ex-
periment again using a keyboard which more closely mimics the actions
required to interact with the objects (i.e., the hand is lifted and moved to
the side).
5.1. Participants
The 64 German participants were recruited from introductory psychology
classes at Dresden University of Technology, and they were given partial
course credit for their participation.
5.2. Materials
The objects and the contents of the sentences were the same as in Expe-
riment 1, except that the sentences were translated into German. For
instance, the sentence ‘‘Hold the apple by the stem’’ was translated as
‘‘Hebe den Apfel am Stiel an’’.
5.3. Design and procedure
The design and procedure were equivalent to Experiment 1, except that a
keyboard was used as the response apparatus.
2. Twenty-seven German psychology students participated in this experiment. Their joy-
stick movement times for normal sentences referring to visible objects yielded an insig-
niﬁcant ACE of 28 msec, ACE F (1, 26) ¼ 1.04,Mse ¼ 22444. Error rates did not yield
any signiﬁcant e¤ects either, averaging only 4%.
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5.4. Results and discussion
The same data trimming procedures were used as in Experiment 1, lead-
ing to the exclusion of two participants with unusually high error rates.
The data of major interest are presented in Table 4. Replicating Ex-
periment 1, we found a signiﬁcant Compatibility e¤ect of 102 msec,
F (1, 61) ¼ 7.73, Mse ¼ 646783. That is, people were faster to respond
correctly when the correct response (Normal, for these sentences) re-
quired movement toward the same side as the location of the object. The
size of the Compatibility e¤ect was similar for the Action sentences (122
msec) and the Descriptive sentences (83 msec), and the interaction of
Compatibility and Sentence-Action had an F < 1. The Compatibility ef-
fect was also signiﬁcant for Action and Descriptive sentences separately,
with both ts (61) > 2.09. There were no signiﬁcant e¤ects in the analysis
of error rates (see Table 4 for means).
These results replicate those of Experiment 1 closely, thus demonstrat-
ing that the ACE observed in the previous experiments is not speciﬁc to
the English language. This ﬁnding is consistent with our hypothesis that
language comprehension requires the derivation of episodic a¤ordances
in any language. In addition, the contrast between these results and the
failure to ﬁnd an ACE in an identical experiment using a joystick is con-
sistent with the claim (from Experiment 3) that the ACE reﬂects action
coding of sentences, not simply spatial location.
6. General discussion
The data from the four experiments present a consistent picture. First, an
ACE was found in all experiments, and it was found for both Action sen-
tences and Descriptive sentences, respectively, 63 msec and 49 msec (Ex-
periment 1), 35 msec and 72 msec (Experiment 2), 87 msec and 94 msec
(Experiment 3, Movement condition), and 122 msec and 83 msec (Expe-
riment 4). Finding an ACE for the descriptive sentences is consistent with
work of Tucker and Ellis (1998) and Borghi and colleagues (2004), both
Table 4. Results from Experiment 4
Compatibility Sentence-Action
Action Descriptive
Error Rate RT Error Rate RT
Incompatible .08 1406 .04 1162
Compatible .07 1284 .04 1079
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of whom found evidence for automatic encoding of action components
when people observed pictures of the objects (Tucker and Ellis) or printed
words (Borghi et al.) without any requirement to overtly interact with the
objects. Similarly, Pulvermu¨ller (2008) reports the automatic activation of
motor cortex upon perceiving action verbs when there is no requirement
to act. Thus, we can be relatively conﬁdent that the processing of lan-
guage for meaning activates information about action.
The results are also consistent in showing that the activation of action
information does not depend on the object or a picture being physically
available. The ACE for the Present and Removed conditions, respec-
tively, were 70 msec and 38 msec (Experiment 2; the latter is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, but see footnote 1) and 90 msec and 91 msec (Experi-
ment 3, Movement condition). Thus, action encoding is characteristic of
perceptual symbols (e.g., Barsalou 1999) as well as actual objects.
In contrast to this consistency, changing the response mode greatly re-
duced or eliminated the ACE. In the Location condition of Experiment 3,
the ACE was a non-signiﬁcant 16 msec, and in the experiment using a
joystick (see footnote 2), it was a non-signiﬁcant –28 msec. This contrast
helps to rule out several alternative explanations. First, the ACE is un-
likely to be a spatial compatibility e¤ect or Simon e¤ect (Simon 1990).
That is, if the ACE arose from a mismatch between the (irrelevant) loca-
tion of the object referred to in the sentence and the location of the re-
sponse, it should be found whether the response requires movement or
not.
The contrast in response modes also helps to rule out several (if not all)
variants of attentional hypotheses. Thus, the ACE is unlikely to be due to
physical orientation to the objects because a) it is found when the objects
are removed and b) it is not found when the objects are present but there
is no requirement to move to make the response (-3 msec ACE in Loca-
tion condition, objects present). Also, it is unlikely that the ACE reﬂects a
simple covert attention to the location of the items (whether present or
removed) as demonstrated by Richardson and Spivey (2000). If the e¤ect
was due to covert attention to the location, the e¤ect should be found for
both the Movement and Location response modes. Note that we are not
suggesting that people do not covertly attend to locations in which objects
were previously displayed. We are suggesting, however, that an attentional
mechanism without regard to action is not su‰cient to account for the
ACE. One other attentional account that is weakened by the pattern of
data is the suggestion that ACE reﬂects covert attention to spatial loca-
tion conjoined with a movement of attention needed to guide hand move-
ments. This account has di‰culty explaining the ﬁnding that the ACE
was measured by reading time before the necessity for any movement.
130 A. M. Glenberg et al.
Author's Copy
A
ut
ho
r's
 C
op
y
Author's Copy
A
ut
ho
r's
 C
op
y
Might some form of spatial working memory su‰ce to explain the
e¤ects in the objects-removed conditions of Experiments 2 and 3? This
account also seems unlikely if one conceives of spatial working memory
as holding abstract representation. That is, such a representation has no
obvious way of accounting for the absence of the e¤ect in the Location
Response Mode of Experiment 3. Whatever is producing the ACE, it
must be speciﬁc to action, not just spatial location.
One might still argue that attention shifted in anticipation of the hand
movement, thus, hypothetically, the ACE arises because of a) covert shift
in attention to the location of objects that are not present and b) a shift in
attention in anticipation of guidance of hand movements. While logically
possible, this alternative appears more complex (two covert processes
neither of which is required by the reading task) than the explanation
favored here: The ACE reﬂects access of action-related components of
meaning, and in the incompatible condition those components interfere
with the need to move in the opposite direction.
To spell out this account more fully, we propose the following (as
based on the Indexical Hypothesis). First, participants index words or
phrases (e.g., ‘‘the apple’’) to actual objects or their perceptual symbols.
Second, a¤ordances are derived from these objects. It is at this stage that
the data from the four experiments help to ﬂesh out the theoretical
claims. The data support the claim that a¤ordances are a component of
the information derived whether or not one intends to literally act on the
objects. Furthermore, these a¤ordances are not only those that might be
stored in long-term memory. Instead, the a¤ordances take into account
current or recent experience with the objects. Third, as described in Ka-
schak and Glenberg (2000) and de Vega and colleagues (2004), but not
tested here, the a¤ordances are combined as speciﬁed by syntax. Finally,
the processes of deriving and combining a¤ordances require premotor
cortex (Rizzolatti and Arbib 1998) and motor cortex (Hauk et al. 2004).
The use of these systems to simulate the meaning of the sentences in-
terferes with the literal movement required to make the response, thus
resulting in the ACE. Note that by this account, perceptual symbols cor-
respond to an active simulation that is based on both perceptual informa-
tion and actions consistent with that information.
Several aspects of the claims made in this article may seem unusual.
Here we discuss how these claims are not just supported by the empirical
data but also make theoretical and practical sense. Consider ﬁrst how
skill in indexing is of beneﬁt to language users. According to many older
(Collins and Loftus 1975; Kintsch 1988) and more recent (Burgress and
Lund 1997; Landauer and Dumais 1997; Vigliocco et al. 2004) theories
of meaning and language, the meaning of a word (e.g, ‘‘chair’’) is
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captured by features stored in memory. Consequently, it is di‰cult to
extend the use of these words to new, unanticipated situations, except
perhaps through a process of inference and analogy. In contrast, consider
the ﬂexibility of indexing and using characteristics of the indexed object
(or perceptual symbol) as the meaning. Indexing a word such as ‘‘chair’’
at di¤erent times to a kitchen chair, a throne, a dollhouse chair, or a log
near a campﬁre, allows very di¤erent properties to become relevant to
comprehension. Thus, a sentence about standing on a chair to change a
light bulb in a ceiling ﬁxture is sensible when the chair is a kitchen chair,
but not when it is a dollhouse chair; or one can count the rings to deter-
mine the age of the chair near the campﬁre, but not the chair in the
palace. Thus, indexing allows a limited set of words to be used ﬂexibly
in di¤erent situations to address the needs of communication within that
situation.
The ﬂexibility in indexing runs the risk of confusion, that is, the
speaker may index a word to one thing (e.g., a kitchen chair) and the lis-
tener may index the word to something quite di¤erent (e.g., a log). This
potential for confusion is greatly reduced by the highly practiced (Clark
1996) and virtually automatic (Clark 1996; Kelly et al. 1999; Pickering
and Garrod 2004) procedures for establishing common ground. Thus, in-
dexing allows e¤ective ‘‘o¤-loading’’ of cognition to the environment
(Wilson 2002). That is, rather than storing all possible meanings and fea-
tures of words in memory, the relevant features are derived, when needed,
from the situation at hand.
Presuming that indexing does occur, why should anything like a¤ord-
ances be derived from the objects or perceptual symbols? There are at
least two answers to this question. The ﬁrst relates to the symbol ground-
ing problem. Searle (1980), Harnad (1990) and others have argued that
symbols (e.g., words) can only be meaningful when they are grounded in
something outside of the symbol system. Action provides a compelling
domain in which to ground meaning (Glenberg 1997; Tucker and Ellis
1998). Here we develop a di¤erent line of reasoning, namely that deriva-
tion and combination of a¤ordances can serve the metacognitive purpose
of detecting when one has improperly indexed a term, and thus when one
is not adequately understanding what the speaker or writer is trying to
convey. The key idea is that a¤ordances are not arbitrary, nor can they
be arbitrarily combined. Consider understanding an imperative such as
‘‘Stand on the chair to change the light bulb in the ceiling ﬁxture.’’ If a
listener were to index ‘‘the chair’’ to a dollhouse chair (perhaps because
of recently playing with a child and a dollhouse), the listener would be
puzzled because the dollhouse chair does not a¤ord standing-on to raise
the body. Note that this process does not require a sophisticated metacog-
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nitive analysis of the state of comprehension. Instead, failure to under-
stand is immediately signaled by the inability to simulate (or carry out)
the actions. When simulation runs afoul of a¤ordances, one option is try
to re-establish common ground by re-indexing.
How do these claims relate to the notion of episodic a¤ordances? In
some ways, the term ‘‘episodic’’ is redundant. That is, a¤ordances refer
to the relation between a particular type of body and a particular situa-
tion, and because bodies and situations are in constant ﬂux, the a¤ord-
ances are too. We introduce the term to focus attention on the fact that
although some a¤ordances could be stored in memory, many need to be
derived from the current situation. Although the experimental work fo-
cused on a¤ordances related to spatial location, there may well be other
factors that contribute to episodic a¤ordances, for example, human goals.
The relevant a¤ordances of a (kitchen) chair depend on goals: does one
need to sit, change a light bulb, hide in a game of hide-and-seek, or de-
fend oneself against a snarling dog? Not all a¤ordances are derived at
any one time because most of those a¤ordances would be irrelevant to
the current situation and goals (see Kaschak and Glenberg 2000, for
data supporting this contention). Thus, the properties of the situation
that determine meaning change with physical properties of the situation,
biological properties of the body, and psychological properties such as
goals. Given that human goals are likely to be quite diverse, a communi-
cation system that can deal ﬂexibly with this diversity is advantageous.
Episodic a¤ordances are one signature of this ﬂexibility.
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